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FOOLS RUSH IN WHERE LAWYERS WOULD BETTER 
TREAD: THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AND 
RELATED STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
The People of the State of New York v. Alias Stone1 
(decided February 13, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An old proverb states that “every man who is his own lawyer, 
has a fool for a client.”2  Despite these words of wisdom, the Su-
preme Court of the United States “bestow[ed] a constitutional right 
on one to make a fool of himself” in Faretta v. California3 when it 
identified the right to self-representation implicit in the Sixth 
Amendment.4 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”5  A criminal 
defendant’s ability to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
and proceed pro se was first recognized in Faretta, which has since 
precipitated numerous concerns regarding the competing interests of 
a defendant’s right to counsel versus his freedom to waive that same 
right and act as his own counsel.  Presumably, the average defendant 
 
1 6 N.E.3d 572 (N.Y. 2014). 
2 Often incorrectly attributed to President Abraham Lincoln, this quote was first published 
in an 1825 collection of “witty quotes,” and it appears in the following context.  HENRY 
KETT, THE FLOWERS OF WIT 115 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke & Co. 1825).  A layperson 
mentioned to a lawyer that a particular book of medicine qualified anyone to be his own 
physician.  Id.  The lawyer responded, “How far that may be the case . . . , I will not presume 
to determine; but I may be allowed to speak decidedly as to my own profession; and so I hes-
itate not to pronounce, that every man who is his own lawyer, has a fool for a client.”  Id. 
3 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
4 Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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is unlikely to provide himself with as effective a defense as an expe-
rienced attorney, and disallowing self-representation would further 
the interest of providing a fair trial.6  At the same time, a defendant 
should have the freedom to make his own choices, and it likewise 
seems unfair to force an attorney upon him against his will.7  Justice 
Blackmun foresaw serious problems with the right to self-
representation in his dissent to the very same decision that established 
the right, stating that “[many of the] procedural problems spawned by 
[the Faretta decision], such as the standards of waiver and the treat-
ment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant 
who elects to exercise his right to self-representation.”8  The struggle 
between these interests has resulted in courts placing limitations on 
self-representation in order to balance all the constitutional concerns 
at stake.  Still, many of these boundaries remain unclear, and it ap-
pears that Justice Blackmun’s premonitory words have become a re-
ality. 
This note will examine a recent case before the New York 
Court of Appeals, People v. Stone,9 which considered the issue of 
whether a trial court was constitutionally required to sua sponte as-
sess a defendant’s mental capacity when he requested to represent 
himself.  The Court of Appeals characterized Stone as a case that 
contemplated the intersection of several constitutional rights—
namely, the due process requirement that a criminal defendant be 
competent to stand trial, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the corresponding right to proceed pro se.10  This note 
will expand upon these broader constitutional concerns, both federal-
ly and in New York, as they relate to the more specific question re-
garding mental competency presented in Stone.  Part II will outline 
the relevant facts and court discussion in Stone.  Part III will provide 
a constitutional framework by defining the rights to counsel and self-
representation generally.  The competency limitations imposed on 
self-representation by the federal and New York courts will be exam-
ined in Parts IV and V, respectively.  Part VI will analyze the various 
standards of mental competency that courts have articulated, identify 
the inconsistencies, and ultimately argue that the New York approach 
 
6 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
7 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
8 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
9 6 N.E.3d 572 (N.Y. 2014). 
10 Id. at 574-75. 
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is more workable than the federal approach.  Finally, Part VII will re-
visit People v. Stone, and Part VIII will conclude with a brief sum-
mary. 
II. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK V. ALIAS STONE 
The New York Court of Appeals recently held in People v. 
Stone that a trial court was not constitutionally obligated, under either 
federal or New York law, to order a competency hearing sua sponte 
prior to granting a criminal defendant’s request to proceed pro se, 
where the trial court had no reason to question the defendant’s mental 
competency. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Alias Stone was tried on two counts of burglary in the New 
York County Supreme Court after he trespassed into secure areas of a 
hotel and stole a cell phone.11  At trial, Stone indicated that he did not 
trust his lawyer or the criminal justice system, so he requested to pro-
ceed pro se.12  The trial court repeatedly warned Stone that it was 
unwise to proceed on his own and attempted to persuade him to con-
tinue with assigned counsel.13  Nevertheless, Stone insisted that his 
“paranoia” and lack of faith in the legal system led to his firm wish to 
represent himself and do “the best [he could] on his own.”14  Stone’s 
appointed counsel also tried to discuss the matter with him, but ulti-
mately even he agreed that Stone should proceed pro se since there 
was no convincing him otherwise.15  Aside from this deep distrust of 
the “system,” Stone otherwise appeared mentally sound.16  The court 
granted Stone’s request, believing him to be intelligent despite his 
lack of legal training, but directed that his original attorney remain 
available as stand-by counsel.17  After a short period of self-
representation, Stone became “nervous” and asked stand-by counsel 
to step in.18  At no point during trial did Stone or his assigned counsel 
 
11 Id. at 573. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 573. 
15 Id. 
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raise any issue of Stone’s mental capacity.19 
Stone was convicted at trial of two counts of burglary.20  Two 
months after trial, defense counsel hired a social worker to evaluate 
Stone “for sentencing purposes.”21  After concluding her evaluation, 
the social worker advised the court that Stone may have undiagnosed 
mental problems.22  The prosecution then informed the court that 
Stone’s family had also noticed he had developed mental issues.23  
The court ordered an examination pursuant to New York Criminal 
Procedure Law section 730.30,24 which requires mental examination 
of a defendant where the court believes he may be incapacitated and 
unable to comprehend the proceedings against him.25  The psychiatric 
evaluations confirmed that Stone had developed mental health issues, 
including hallucinations, delusions, and possible psychotic or depres-
sive disorder.26  In January 2010, the hearing court found Stone unfit 
to proceed with sentencing.27  Stone thereafter underwent medical 
treatment, and in April 2010, the trial court found that he had “recov-
ered his competency” and could be sentenced.28 
Stone appeared for his sentencing in May 2010.29  The prose-
cution listed his extensive history of theft offenses, while defense 
counsel focused on Stone’s abusive childhood and stressed that his 
previous offenses were nonviolent.30  Stone then gave a personal 
statement where he spoke out against the criminal justice system, de-
scribed his lifetime of imprisonment, and asserted that he “never re-
ceived help transitioning to civilian life.”31  Ultimately, the court sen-
tenced Stone to seven years in prison with five years post-release 
 
19 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574, 577. 
20 Id. at 573. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 573-74. 
24 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574. 
25 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(1) (McKinney 2011) (“At any time after a defendant is 
arraigned upon an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint and before the impo-
sition of sentence, or at any time after a defendant is arraigned upon a felony complaint and 
before he is held for the action of the grand jury, the court wherein the criminal action is 
pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may 
be an incapacitated person.”); see also discussion infra Part V.B.1. 





31 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574. 
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supervision with the terms to run concurrently.32 
Stone appealed his conviction to the First Department of the 
New York State Supreme Court’s Appellate Division, alleging that 
the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it 
failed to examine his mental capacity before allowing him to repre-
sent himself.33  Stone urged that numerous “red flags” arose before, 
during, and after trial, all of which should have alerted the court to 
his lack of competency.34  Additionally, Stone argued that the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Indiana v. Edwards35 established a mini-
mum competency standard to stand trial and a heightened standard to 
represent oneself, so the trial court should have ordered a hearing to 
examine Stone’s capacity to proceed pro se.36  The First Department 
rejected Stone’s argument and affirmed the trial court decision.37  
Stone appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.38 
B. Court of Appeals Discussion of Stone 
Affirming the First Department’s decision, the Court of Ap-
peals led its discussion by noting the implication in Stone of two con-
stitutional imperatives: (1) the due process requirement that a defend-
ant be competent to stand trial before proceeding39 and (2) the Sixth 
Amendment right to self-representation, coupled with the “corre-
sponding” right to competent counsel.40  New York’s standard for 
competency to stand trial has been codified in Criminal Procedure 
Law section 730.10(1),41 which is consistent with the federal standard 




34 See id. at 577. 
35 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
36 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 574-75. 
40 Id. at 575. 
41 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10(1) (McKinney 2011) (“ ‘Incapacitated person’ means a 
defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the pro-
ceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.”). 
42 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether 
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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Both require that the defendant be able to understand the proceedings 
against him and assist in his own defense.43  In New York, the State 
must prove the defendant’s competency according to the statutory 
standard only where there is some indication that his mental capacity 
is questionable; otherwise, the defendant is presumed to be compe-
tent.44  Likewise, a pro se application in New York should be granted 
only if the defendant “effectuates a knowing, voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel.”45  The trial court must make a 
“searching inquiry” into the defendant’s understanding of his deci-
sion to refuse counsel.46 
The Court of Appeals then discussed two cases in depth be-
fore distinguishing both from the case at bar: Indiana v. Edwards and 
People v. Reason,47 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and the New 
York Court of Appeals, respectively.  In Edwards, the trial court con-
ducted several competency hearings before finding that the defend-
ant, a delusional schizophrenic, was competent to stand trial, yet his 
mental illness rendered him incompetent to proceed pro se.48  The 
Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that states are constitutionally per-
mitted to find a mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial but in-
competent to represent himself.49  The Court reasoned that since men-
tal illness can vary in degree, in manner, and over time, a defendant’s 
competence to make decisions and carry out different tasks may 
likewise vary.50  In Stone, the Court of Appeals rejected Stone’s as-
sertion that Edwards established a baseline competency standard for 
a defendant to stand trial and a heightened standard to proceed pro 
se.51  The court further disagreed with Stone’s interpretation of Ed-
wards that a competency hearing is always required before a defend-
ant can represent himself.52  In support of both of these rulings, the 
Court of Appeals emphasized how Edwards merely established that a 
trial court may constitutionally deny a defendant the right to self-
representation based on mental illness and lack of competency; this 
 
43 See supra notes 41, 42. 
44 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575. 
45 Id. at 575. 
46 Id. 
47 334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975). 
48 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575. 
49 Id. at 575-76. 
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holding from Edwards does not, however, compel a trial court to do 
so.53 
The Court of Appeals then cited its decision in People v. Rea-
son,54 where it likewise recognized that a mentally ill defendant may 
possess varying capacities to complete different tasks.  The trial court 
in Reason had ordered an examination of the defendant’s competency 
to stand trial prior to granting his pro se request.55  When the defend-
ant insisted that he should have received a hearing on his competency 
to proceed pro se, in addition to the hearing on his competency to 
stand trial, the Court of Appeals refused to draw a bright line between 
levels of mental capacity with respect to these two issues.56  Mental 
capacity is merely a factor to be considered in determining a valid 
waiver of the right to counsel; there is “[no] distinct competency in-
quiry.”57  Unless there is reason to question the defendant’s mental 
capacity, a formal hearing is not a precondition for a court’s adjudica-
tion of a pro se request.58 
The Court of Appeals construed the Stone case as “signifi-
cantly different” from both Edwards and Reason.59  In the latter two 
cases, the trial court was on notice of the defendant’s mental illness 
both before and during trial, in turn leading to the competency hear-
ings; in Stone, by contrast, the defendant’s mental issues did not arise 
until after the completion of trial, and the court otherwise had “no 
reason to question his mental health” at the time of his pro se re-
quest.60  The court rejected Stone’s examples of noticeable mental in-
stability—namely, his distrust of the legal system, his “paranoia” and 
dissatisfaction with his attorney, as well as his occasional “obstreper-
ous conduct” and “emotional outbursts.”61  This behavior is not un-
common among criminal defendants and was not substantial enough 
to suggest mental illness and require a formal competency evalua-
tion.62 
 
53 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576. 
54 334 N.E.2d at 573. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 574. 
57 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576 (internal quotations omitted). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 577. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 577-78. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: DEFINING THE RIGHTS TO 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND SELF-REPRESENTATION 
The following section will broadly outline the rights to assis-
tance of counsel and self-representation before considering the limita-
tions courts have placed on the latter in an effort to preserve the in-
tegrity of the former.  As a fundamental right expressly provided for 
in the Bill of Rights, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of 
counsel has been recognized since its inception as a necessary com-
ponent of due process and a fair trial.63  Thus, when the Supreme 
Court established the implied Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation nearly 200 years later in Faretta v. California,64 the 
dissenting Justices expressed concern as to how this right would be 
fairly applied without compromising the right to counsel.65  It is im-
portant to understand the interests underlying these countervailing 
rights in order to appreciate the consequential limitations that courts 
have placed on self-representation. 
A. The Right to Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon United States 
citizens the right to “have the Assistance of Counsel for [their] de-
 
63 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (describing the right to counsel as “neces-
sary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 52, 67-69 (1932) (characterizing the right to counsel as a “necessary incident of a fair 
trial,” as well as a “fundamental principle[] of liberty and justice which lie[s] at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions,” and expounding that a refusal of the right to counsel 
would amount to “a denial of . . . due process in the constitutional sense”). 
64 Although the Supreme Court in Faretta insisted that the right to self-representation has 
been “protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation,” 422 U.S. at 812, both dissent-
ing Justices argued that despite this statutory history, the Framers’ omission of the right in 
the Sixth Amendment is evidence that it was not intended as a constitutional right, id. at 844 
(Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Thus, Faretta was the first Su-
preme Court case to unambiguously declare self-representation as a constitutional right. 
65 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the spirit and the logic of the 
Sixth Amendment are that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible 
defense; in the vast majority of cases this command can be honored only by means of the 
expressly guaranteed right to counsel . . .”; and “there is nothing desirable or useful in per-
mitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon 
conducting his own defense to criminal charges.”); id. at 849, 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(finding no basis for the right to self-representation in the Sixth Amendment, viewing the 
right as one that ignores “the established principle” that the State’s interest in a criminal 
prosecution is not to win but to serve justice and determine the ultimate truth, and expressing 
concern with the procedural problems that will result from this right). 
8
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fence [in criminal prosecutions].”66  The Supreme Court has empha-
sized the vulnerability of an unrepresented defendant, who—
regardless of his intelligence—lacks knowledge of the intricacies of 
the law, familiarity with the rules of evidence, and the skills required 
to prepare his own defense.67  To ensure that a defendant’s ignorance 
does not result in an unfair conviction, he is entitled to representation 
by an attorney whose legal training should provide him with the best 
defense possible.68  It would be an undue deprivation not only of his 
rights to due process and a fair trial, but also his basic human rights, 
to allow a defendant to proceed to trial without proper representa-
tion.69  The right to counsel is so essential that it has been deemed 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.70  Notwithstanding its obligation to comport with the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, New York State al-
so provides its defendants with the right to counsel: “In any trial in 
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and 
defend in person and with counsel . . . .”71  Like the Supreme Court, 
New York courts have expressed similar sentiments about the fun-
damental nature of this right in light of a defendant’s inherent inabil-
ity to provide a strong defense without experienced counsel.72 
B. The Right to Self-Representation 
The Supreme Court declared in Faretta v. California that 
along with a defendant’s right to counsel exists a converse constitu-
tional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se.73  In Faretta, the de-
fendant was criminally convicted after the trial court denied his ap-
plication to proceed pro se, reasoning that he had no constitutional 
 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
67 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63, 465; Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
68 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465; Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69; see also supra note 65. 
69 See supra note 63. 
70 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 67. 
71 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
72 See People v. Rosen, 613 N.E.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. 1993) (“A defendant lacking legal 
training and courtroom experience may be at a decided disadvantage in carrying out the 
complex task of presenting a defense.”); People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 
1974) (acknowledging the strong societal interest that criminal trials determine the “truth or 
falsity of the charges in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness,” which is unlikely to 
occur if a defendant represents himself). 
73 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. 
9
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right to self-representation.74  The Supreme Court disagreed,75 engag-
ing in an extensive discussion about the historical bases, in both 
statutory and case law, that necessarily imply a Sixth Amendment 
right to self-representation.76  Because the Sixth Amendment “per-
sonally” and “directly” grants defendants various rights to assist in 
their own defense, it follows that they are also entitled to conduct 
their own defense pro se, should they choose to do so.77  The purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment is to provide defendants with the tools to de-
fend themselves, and “[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused, against 
his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.”78  
Additionally, early American and English legal history both show 
that self-representation was once not only customary, but it was the 
default form of representation.79 
The Supreme Court also cited its own precedent in support of 
its holding in Faretta.  Both Snyder v. Massachusetts80 and Price v. 
Johnston81 had previously contemplated, in dicta, the possibility of a 
defendant conducting his own defense.82  Further, in Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann,83 the Court held that a defendant may exercise 
his “free and intelligent choice” to waive his constitutional right to 
counsel; hence, “the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a de-
fendant.”84  Though this declaration from Adams proved helpful to 
the Faretta analysis, the Supreme Court noted that a different issue 
was presented in Faretta—specifically, “[w]hether the Constitution 
forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant.”85  In other 
words, it was already well-established that a defendant may choose to 
proceed without counsel, assuming that the trial court has no qualms 
 
74 Id. at 810-11. 
75 Id. at 836. 
76 Id. at 817. 
77 Id. at 819-20. 
78 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820. 
79 Id. at 823. 
80 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
81 334 U.S. 266 (1948), abrogated on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 
(1991). 
82 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816. 
83 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
84 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279).  The Supreme Court in 
Adams also noted that “a shrewd and experienced layman may, for his own sufficient rea-
sons, conduct his own defense if he prefers to do so.”  Adams, 317 U.S. at 278. 
85 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815. 
10
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with this choice.  What was unsettled until Faretta, however, was 
whether a trial court could force a defendant to accept counsel against 
his will.  The majority in Faretta answered this question in the nega-
tive.86 
The Faretta Court emphasized the importance of a defend-
ant’s autonomy and freedom to make his own choices, even if they 
result in “his own detriment.”87  The Court acknowledged that there 
are credible arguments against recognizing a right to self-
representation, such as the value of a lawyer’s role in assuring a fair 
trial for a criminal defendant.88  However, “it is one thing to hold that 
every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of coun-
sel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to 
accept a lawyer he does not want.”89  As important as the right to 
counsel may be, free choice is likewise an invaluable, fundamental 
right.90  In most cases, a defendant is obviously better off with coun-
sel; yet, if the defendant is unwilling to accept his counsel’s assis-
tance, “the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience 
can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly.”91  Furthermore, it is not 
“inconceivable” that a defendant may present a better defense than 
would his counsel.92  In sum, the Court came to a “nearly universal 
conviction” that, assuming a defendant validly waives his right to 
counsel, “forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to 
his basic right to defend himself . . . .”93 
While federal law identifies self-representation as an implied 
right, the New York Constitution expressly confers this right on its 
citizens: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be 
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . .”94  
Likewise, three separate sections of the New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law provide that if a defendant seeks to proceed without coun-
sel, “the court must permit him to do so [if] it is satisfied that he 
made such decision with knowledge of the significance thereof . . . 
 
86 Id. at 807. 
87 Id. at 834. 
88 Id. at 832-33. 
89 Id. at 833. 
90 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34. 
91 Id. at 834. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 817. 
94 N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 6 (emphasis added). 
11
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.”95  New York case law has upheld this right, but it has also revealed 
that, much like federal law, the boundaries of self-representation 
“remain largely undefined.”96  These unclear boundaries are a result 
of New York’s difficulty in balancing what it recognizes as two 
equally important but competing interests: a defendant’s autonomy to 
make free choices versus his fair trial right to an effective defense.97 
IV. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION 
The federal right to self-representation is not absolute.98  
Though a defendant’s autonomy and volition deserve great respect, 
the competing interest of his fair trial right to an effective defense re-
quires certain conditions to be met before allowing a defendant to 
represent himself.99  First, the defendant must be competent to stand 
trial.100  Of course, if a defendant lacks the mental capacity to stand 
trial, then his inability to stand trial will render his self-representation 
a non-issue; nonetheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that this is 
 
95 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(6) (McKinney 2007); Id. at § 180.10(5); Id. at § 
210.15(5). 
96 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326. 
97 See Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575 (characterizing the rights to counsel and self-representation 
as “corresponding—and sometimes competing” interests); People v. Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d 
1154, 1155-56 (N.Y. 2002) (describing the right to counsel and the right to forego counsel as 
“inherently antagonistic ideals,” so in order to best serve the interests of justice and funda-
mental fairness, the right to self-representation must be qualified); Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949 
(noting that the right to self-representation exists partly “to affirm the dignity and autonomy 
of the accused,” but also acknowledging that a defendant who is legally inexperienced may 
be disadvantaged “in carrying out the complex task of presenting a defense”); McIntyre, 324 
N.E.2d at 325 (emphasizing an individual’s right to “determine his own destiny,” which is 
embodied in the right to self-representation, as well as the “countervailing interest of socie-
ty” that the criminal justice system is supposed to determine the “truth or falsity of the 
charges in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness”). 
98 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 171. 
99 Because this note focuses on the self-representation limitations related to mental com-
petency, other limitations on the exercise of the right are not relevant to this discussion; 
however, for the sake of comprehensiveness, they will be briefly addressed.  In a footnote, 
the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California remarked that a state may (1) terminate the right 
to self-representation of a defendant who “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist 
misconduct” and (2) insist upon “standby counsel” to assist and be available if the defendant 
needs help or forfeits his self-representation right.  422 U.S. at 834 n.46.  Some other re-
strictions may include a timely request to proceed pro se, as well as a clear and unequivocal 
communication of the request.  Tiffany Frigenti, Note, Flying Solo Without a License: The 
Right of Pro Se Defendants to Crash and Burn – People v. Smith, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1019, 
1032-33 (2013). 
100 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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a prerequisite to exercising the right to self-representation.101  Sec-
ond, the court must find that the defendant waived his right to coun-
sel competently, knowingly, and voluntarily.102  Third, the defendant 
must also be competent to conduct his own defense, as distinguished 
from his competence to choose self-representation.103  The Supreme 
Court has attempted to define the levels of competency a defendant 
must exhibit to satisfy each of these requirements; however, the nu-
ances between the standards are difficult to discern, and courts strug-
gle to apply them appropriately without compromising the integrity 
of the constitutional rights they are intended to protect. 
A. Competency to Stand Trial 
This subsection will summarize federal case law governing 
competency to stand trial, which must be established both to effect a 
valid waiver of counsel and to exercise the right to self-
representation,104 and which has been used by the Supreme Court as a 
starting point in articulating other related standards of competency.105 
Due process requires that criminal defendants be mentally 
competent to stand trial before they can be prosecuted without of-
fending the Constitution.106  In a short, two-paragraph opinion, the 
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States107 created a two-part test 
that established the minimum standard of competency required by the 
Constitution.  First, the defendant must have “sufficient present abil-
ity to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding.”108  Second, the defendant must have a “rational as well 
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”109 
 
101 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
102 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
103 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
104 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 409 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Today, the 
majority holds that [the] standard of competence [to stand trial] is constitutionally adequate 
to assess a defendant’s competence to waive the right to counsel and represent himself.”); 
see also id. at 400 (majority opinion).  The Godinez majority explained that a defendant must 
be competent to stand trial before he can waive his right to counsel.  Id.  Since waiver of the 
right to counsel is a prerequisite to self-representation, it follows that competency to stand 
trial must also be satisfied before a defendant can exercise his right to represent himself. 
105 See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C. 
106 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 
(1966). 
107 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
108 Id. at 402. 
109 Id. 
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have elaborated on this 
test by articulating factors to consider for satisfying the Dusky com-
petence standard.  In Pate v. Robinson,110 the Court suggested that 
trial courts look into the defendant’s (1) “history of pronounced irra-
tional behavior,” (2) “demeanor at trial,” and (3) prior psychiatric his-
tory, if any.111  None of these factors is dispositive.112  Drope v. Mis-
souri113 examined the same three competency factors even further, 
explaining that trial courts should evaluate the factors collectively 
since there are “no fixed or immutable signs” that will necessarily in-
dicate competence.114  Furthermore, competence is an ever-changing 
state, so courts should “be alert” to indications of change in a defend-
ant’s mental capabilities.115 
B. Waiver of the Right to Assistance of Counsel 
A valid waiver of the right to counsel is another prerequisite 
to a defendant being permitted to represent himself.116  Much like the 
rationale behind the right to self-representation, a defendant’s right to 
refuse counsel is an extension of his individual liberty to make free 
choices.117  By definition, a waiver is an “intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”118  Thus, a waiver 
will not be valid unless it is provided competently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily.119  The Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran120 character-
ized this as a two-part inquiry, where (1) the competence inquiry fo-
cuses on whether the defendant has the mental capacity and “ability 
to understand the proceedings,” and (2) the knowing and voluntary 
inquiry questions whether the defendant “actually does understand 
the significance and consequences of a particular decision,” and 
whether the decision is made willingly and is “uncoerced.”121  The 
 
110 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 
111 Id. at 386. 
112 Id.; Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 
113 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). 
114 Id. at 180. 
115 Id. at 181. 
116 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
117 Adams, 317 U.S. at 275. 
118 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
119 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401-02; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Adams, 317 U.S. at 275, 279; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 468. 
120 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
121 Id. at 401 n.12 (emphases in original). 
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defendant need not have “the skill and experience of a lawyer” in or-
der to waive the right to counsel knowingly and intelligently,122 but 
he should be informed of, and be able to appreciate, the risks and 
consequences involved.123  Trial courts should engage in a fact-
specific analysis in each case by investigating areas such as the de-
fendant’s “background, experience, and conduct.”124  Courts must 
“indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the right to 
counsel and be certain that a defendant has provided a valid waiver 
before depriving him of this constitutional right.125 
The Court in Godinez determined that the standard of compe-
tence for waiver of counsel is no higher than the standard of compe-
tence to stand trial, stressing the distinction between the competence 
to waive the right to counsel versus the competence to actually pro-
ceed without counsel and conduct one’s own trial defense.126  It is 
therefore sufficient, where the defendant seeks to waive his right to 
counsel, that he satisfy the same competency standard articulated in 
Dusky.127  By contrast, the standard of competency to proceed pro se 
may be higher than the Dusky standard, as discussed below. 
C. COMPETENCY TO PROCEED PRO SE 
Separate and distinct from the self-representation prerequisite 
that a defendant provide a competent waiver of the right to counsel is 
the additional requirement that he be competent to conduct his own 
defense.  In Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme Court held that a trial 
court can constitutionally deny a defendant’s self-representation re-
quest based on a finding that, while he may satisfy the minimum lev-
el of competency to stand trial as articulated in Dusky, he may never-
theless fall into a “gray area” of mental competency where he is 
unable to conduct his own defense due to mental illness.128  The de-
fendant in Edwards had a history of mental problems, including delu-
sions and schizophrenia, so the court subjected him to several compe-
tency hearings before deeming him fit to stand trial.129  The trial court 
 
122 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
123 Id.; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
124 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
125 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514, 516 (1962); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
126 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399. 
127 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
128 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173-76. 
129 Id. at 167-69. 
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refused his subsequent pro se request, observing that although he was 
competent to stand trial, his mental illness limited his ability to con-
duct his own defense.130  After he was convicted, the defendant ap-
pealed, asserting a violation of his constitutional right to self-
representation.131  The matter reached the Indiana Supreme Court, 
which held that the State was required to allow the defendant to pro-
ceed pro se, but then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the 
issue.132 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards noted that its opinion in 
Godinez was a helpful starting point, but it did not resolve the issue at 
hand.133  In Godinez, the defendant sought to waive his right to coun-
sel, proceed on his own, and merely enter a guilty plea; in Edwards, 
on the other hand, the defendant sought to waive his right to counsel, 
proceed on his own, and conduct his own trial proceedings.134  Thus, 
the issue in Godinez was the defendant’s competence to waive the 
right to counsel, whereas the issue in Edwards was his competence to 
conduct his own defense.135  Also, in Godinez, the Supreme Court 
merely held that a State may “permit a gray-area defendant to repre-
sent himself,” while the issue in Edwards was whether a State may 
“deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself.”136 
In reaching its conclusion, the Edwards Court emphasized 
how mental illness can vary in degree over time and manifest itself in 
different ways.137  As a result, while a defendant’s mental abilities 
may allow him to minimally appreciate the proceedings and constitu-
tionally be subjected to trial, he may fall into a “gray area” where his 
mental abilities do not allow him to “carry out the basic tasks” neces-
sary to conduct his own trial defense.138  Moreover, the purposes of 
promoting a defendant’s “dignity” and “autonomy,” which underlie 
the right to self-representation, are not served in cases where the de-
fendant is not mentally capable of conducting his own defense.139  
The Court concluded that trial courts must be able to take into ac-
 
130 Id. at 169. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172-73. 
134 Id. at 173. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 175-76. 
138 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76. 
139 Id. at 176. 
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count the varying degrees of mental capacity that a defendant may 
exhibit and use their best judgment to determine whether the defend-
ant can stand trial, proceed pro se, or both.140 
V. NEW YORK LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION 
The following section will describe the limitations on self-
representation in New York and identify the major differences be-
tween federal and New York law.141  According to U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, a defendant seeking to proceed pro se must first 
demonstrate (1) competency to stand trial, (2) competency to waive 
the right to counsel, as well as a knowing and voluntary waiver, and 
(3) competency to proceed pro se.142  By contrast, New York only 
partially recognizes the foregoing conditions on self-representation—
specifically, competency to stand trial and a knowing and voluntary 
waiver.  New York does not separately consider competency to waive 
counsel or competency to proceed pro se; rather, trial courts have dis-
cretion to consider a defendant’s overall mental capability as a factor 
in determining a valid waiver of the right to counsel. 
A. The McIntyre Test 
The New York Court of Appeals first articulated the limits on 
the state’s explicit constitutional right to self-representation in People 
v. McIntyre.143  In McIntyre, the trial court denied the defendant’s pro 
se application after he made a rude outburst during the court’s gen-
eral inquiry.144  The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, finding 
the outburst insufficient to warrant refusal of the right to self-
representation, but also acknowledging that until McIntyre there had 
 
140 Id. at 177-78. 
141 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  Similarly, the discussion of self-
representation restrictions in New York will be limited to those that involve mental compe-
tency.  New York also recognizes the limitations discussed in note 99, as seen in the McIn-
tyre test (infra Part V.A), but they do not warrant further analysis in the context of this note. 
142 See discussion supra Part IV. 
143 324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974). 
144 At one point during the court’s questioning of the defendant, the defendant yelled “ 
‘F*** the jury.  I’m not going to trial.’ (Whereupon the defendant jumped up, knocked the 
chair over.).”  Id. at 325.  The court thereafter denied the defendant’s pro se request based on 
this outburst, the court’s conversation with him, and the defendant’s previous assertion that 
he believed assigned counsel to be perfectly competent.  Id. 
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been no clearly defined boundaries surrounding the right.145  In its 
discussion, the Court of Appeals described the competing interests 
involved in the right to self-representation: on the one hand is the cul-
tural ideal that a person has the right to “determine his own destiny,” 
and on the other hand is the countervailing, “yet equally powerful 
ideal” that the courts should ensure a fair trial that determines the ac-
tual truth of criminal charges.146  In light of these concerns, the Court 
of Appeals stressed its reluctance to allow the continued existence of 
the right to self-representation without reasonable limitations.147 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals created a three-pronged 
test for determining whether a criminal defendant may invoke his 
right to represent himself.  First, the pro se request must be “unequiv-
ocal and timely asserted.”148  To be unequivocal, the request must be 
made “clearly and unconditionally,”149 and to be timely, the request 
must be asserted before the start of trial absent “compelling circum-
stances.”150  Second, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently 
waive his right to counsel.151  In determining whether a waiver is ef-
fective, courts should consider the defendant’s personal background, 
such as “age, education, occupation and previous exposure to legal 
procedures,” but ignorance of the law is not alone sufficient to de-
prive a defendant of his right to self-representation.152  Third, the de-
fendant cannot have “engaged in conduct which would prevent the 
fair and orderly exposition of the issues.”153  A defendant’s right to 
self-representation is thus forfeited if he engages in disruptive con-
duct intended to undermine or delay the proceedings.154  Although 
not articulated in McIntyre, the Court of Appeals has identified a 
fourth prerequisite to self-representation that the defendant be compe-
tent to stand trial.155  Competency to stand trial is a rebuttable pre-
sumption, however, so the burden to make an inquiry arises only if 
 
145 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326, 328. 
146 Id. at 325. 
147 Id. at 326. 
148 Id. at 327. 
149 Id. 




154 Id. at 327-28 
155 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574 (“[T]he right of a defendant to act as his own attorney . . . 
can only be premised on a prior determination that he has mental capacity to stand trial.”). 
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there is reason to question it.156 
B. Competency, Waiver, and “Searching Inquiry” 
New York’s inquiry into valid waiver of counsel differs from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s inquiry.  In Godinez, the Supreme Court 
created a two-part inquiry into waiver: first, the defendant must be 
competent to waive his right to counsel, and second, the decision 
must be made knowingly and voluntarily.157  In New York, however, 
the sole inquiry is whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary; the 
defendant’s competency, or “mental capability,”158 in this context is 
just one of several factors that may be considered.159  Similarly, New 
York does not require a separate inquiry into competency to proceed 
pro se, as federal law does.  Despite New York’s lack of distinct 
competency inquiries into waiver of the right to counsel or proceed-
ing pro se, competency to stand trial is a distinct prerequisite to the 
exercise of self-representation, as discussed further below. 
1. Competency to Stand Trial 
In New York, competency to stand trial, or “capacity,” is de-
fined by statute, and a reasonable belief of incapacity compels judi-
cial action; otherwise, sufficient capacity is presumed.  Under New 
York Criminal Procedure Law section 730.30(1), if a court is “of the 
opinion that the [criminal] defendant is an incapacitated person,” then 
 
156 See discussion infra Part V.B.1. 
157 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 401 n.12. 
158 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.  The language employed by the Court of Appeals is not 
always consistent, but it appears that “capacity” tends to refer to the statutory term defined in 
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 730.10, and it equates to the federal standard for 
“competency to stand trial.”  The term “competency” in New York case law is often used 
interchangeably with “capacity,” but can probably be defined more broadly as “mental capa-
bility,” whereas “capacity” is used more frequently in the specific context of ability to stand 
trial.  See, e.g., Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574-76 (mentioning the federal due process requirement 
that a defendant be “competent to stand trial,” and referring to the same standard in New 
York as “mental capacity,” but also using the term “capacity” to describe a defendant’s 
“ability” to effect a knowing and voluntary waiver); People v. Mendez, 801 N.E.2d 382, 384 
(N.Y. 2003) (referring to the statutory definition of “incapacitated person” as a “test for 
competence [to stand trial]”); Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574 (discussing broadly the “stand-
ard[s] of competency” for standing trial and acting pro se, refusing to distinguish between 
“levels of mental capacity,” and noting that “mental capability” should be considered in de-
termining a valid waiver). 
159 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574. 
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it “must issue an order of examination.”160  An “incapacitated person” 
is defined as a “defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect 
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
in his own defense[,]”161 and an “order of examination” is an “order . 
. . directing that [a criminal defendant] be examined for the purpose 
of determining if he is an incapacitated person.”162  Thus, a New 
York court has the statutory obligation to examine a defendant’s 
competency only if it has reason to believe that he is unable to com-
prehend the matters involved.163  A defendant is presumed to be com-
petent, and a mere history of mental illness is not enough to rebut that 
presumption.164  The decision to order such an examination “lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”165  If, pursuant to an 
examination order, the psychiatric examiners come to a unanimous 
opinion regarding the defendant’s capacity, then the trial court may 
conduct a hearing sua sponte on the issue of capacity, but it must 
conduct a hearing upon request of the defendant or prosecutor.166  If, 
however, the examiners are not unanimous in their opinion, then the 
court must conduct a capacity hearing sua sponte.167  This statutory 
definition for “capacity” serves as the New York State equivalent of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s “competency to stand trial” standard pro-
vided in Dusky. 
2. Waiver and “Searching Inquiry” 
The Court of Appeals has further established that trial courts 
must conduct a “searching inquiry” into the second prong of the 
McIntyre test (valid waiver of the right to counsel), or else the waiver 
will be “deemed ineffective.”168  This requirement was first articulat-
ed in People v. Reason, when the Court of Appeals considered 
 
160 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(1) (McKinney 2011). 
161 Id. at § 730.10(1). 
162 Id. at § 730.10(2). 
163 People v. Morgan, 662 N.E.2d 260, 261 (N.Y. 1995). 
164 People v. Gelikkaya, 643 N.E.2d 517, 519 (N.Y. 1994); see also People v. Tafari, 891 
N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2009) (reversing the trial court’s denial of self-
representation right, which was based solely upon defendant’s mental illness and court’s be-
lief that defendant’s medication “affected [his] ability to understand the proceedings”). 
165 Morgan, 662 N.E.2d at 261. 
166 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(2) & (3) (McKinney 2011). 
167 Id. at § 730.30(4). 
168 People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1207-08 (N.Y. 1998); see also People v. Sawyer, 
438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (N.Y. 1982); Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575. 
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whether a trial court must order an examination of a defendant’s 
competency to waive his right to counsel and defend himself if the 
court has already examined the defendant’s competency to stand tri-
al.169  The Reason court prefaced its discussion by “reject[ing] the 
[defendant’s] contention that there are two separate and distinct lev-
els of mental capacity—one to stand trial, another to waive the right 
to be represented by counsel and to act as one’s own attorney.”170  
The court explained that the standard for competency to stand trial 
originated at a time when self-representation was commonplace; it 
would thus be foolish to suggest that a standard “designed to deter-
mine whether a defendant was capable of defending himself, is inad-
equate when he chooses to conduct his own defense.”171  Further, ap-
plication of a heightened standard would likely infringe on the 
constitutional right to self-representation.172 
While the Reason court declined to draw a bright line between 
levels of capacity, it insisted that a defendant’s mental capability is 
still important when considering the validity of a waiver.173  Unlike 
federal law—which requires a two-part inquiry into the validity of a 
waiver, when mental competency is evaluated independently from 
the knowing/voluntary inquiry174—New York courts merely consider 
mental competency as a factor in assessing the sole inquiry of wheth-
er the waiver was knowing/voluntary and thus legally valid.175  The 
record in Reason showed that the trial court had conducted an exami-
 
169 In Reason, the defendant was charged and indicted for murder and attempted murder 
for stabbing two men.  334 N.E.2d at 573.  After his arraignment, the court ordered an exam-
ination of the defendant’s capacity to stand trial, and he was found competent to proceed.  Id.  
The defendant requested to proceed pro se prior to his trial, and he resisted the court’s strong 
urges to allow counsel to represent him.  Id.  The court allowed him to represent himself, and 
the trial concluded with a conviction.  Id.  Although the defendant exhibited unusual behav-
ior during trial, such as “drift[ing] into irrelevant and nearly incoherent discourses,” he firm-
ly insisted that he was not mentally incapacitated and refused to present an insanity defense.  
Id.  Following his trial, the court ordered another examination of the defendant’s mental ca-
pacity to proceed with sentencing.  Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 573.  The examining psychiatrists 
determined, and the court agreed, that the defendant understood the proceedings against him 
and could assist in his own defense.  Id.  On appeal, since the defendant had denied the issue 
of mental incapacity, he argued that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because 
he was not sufficiently competent to represent himself.  Id. The Appellate Division affirmed 
the conviction, and the defendant appealed further to the Court of Appeals.  Id. 
170 Id. at 574. 
171 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 401 n.12. 
175 Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576; Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574. 
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nation of the defendant’s competence to stand trial, repeatedly dis-
cussed with the defendant the dangers involved with self-
representation, and ultimately determined from these interactions that 
he had waived his right “knowingly and intelligently with full aware-
ness of the risks and consequences.”176  The Court of Appeals be-
lieved that the trial court, having considered the defendant’s mental 
competency and whether he understood the dangers involved, made a 
sufficient searching inquiry into the McIntyre prong requiring a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel; a separate 
mental examination was not necessary.177 
Just as the Supreme Court requires when ensuring a valid 
waiver of counsel,178 New York’s searching inquiry of a defendant 
must ensure that he understands his rights and warns him of the risks 
and dangers of proceeding pro se.179  In reaching this goal, a trial 
court should engage in a discussion with the defendant about his 
“age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures 
and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, volun-
tary waiver.”180  This list of factors is not all-inclusive; the Court of 
Appeals has “eschewed application of any rigid formula and en-
dorsed the use of a nonformalistic, flexible inquiry.”181  A waiver of 
the right to counsel will not be deemed ineffective simply for failing 
to question the defendant about each and every one of these fac-
tors.182  Still, the trial court’s dialogue with the defendant should ade-
quately warn him of the inherent perils of self-representation, as well 
as the “singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of 
adjudication,” to ensure he is making an informed decision.183  An 
inquiry is not sufficiently “searching” where the court merely (1) re-
peatedly insists that the defendant continue with assigned counsel;184 
 
176 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575. 
177 Id. at 575-76. 
178 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (“[A defendant] should be made aware of the dangers and dis-
advantages of self-representation.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional 
rights [must be] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely con-
sequences.”). 
179 Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156; People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1991); 
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208; Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d at 1138; Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575. 
180 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208; see also McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
181 People v. Providence, 813 N.E.2d 632, 635 (N.Y. 2004); Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156; 
see also Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208. 
182 Providence, 813 N.E.2d at 635. 
183 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208. 
184 Id. 
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(2) informs the defendant that it is not in his best interest to proceed 
without counsel;185 (3) reassures the defendant that he will have 
standby counsel as an advisor;186 (4) leaves the defendant with no 
choice but to represent himself after refusing to cooperate with or ac-
cept assigned counsel;187 or (5) assumes a valid waiver based on the 
defendant’s apparent sensibility.188 
VI. “HAUNTED TRIALS”189—INCONSISTENT STANDARDS OF 
COMPETENCY 
In a broad sense, the competency limitations on the right to 
self-representation in New York are not entirely dissimilar to those 
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Both New York and federal 
courts recognize the important but competing rights to assistance of 
counsel versus self-representation, as well as their respective interests 
in securing a fair defense versus encouraging individual autonomy.  
Both have delineated reasonable restrictions on the right to self-
representation in an effort to keep it in harmony with the right to 
counsel.  Furthermore, both have emphasized the basic due process 
requirements that a defendant be competent to stand trial and that he 
effect a valid waiver before disposing of a constitutional right.  
Where New York and federal courts diverge, however, is in their ap-
plication of the competency requirements and articulation of stand-
ards for them. 
The U.S. Supreme Court conditions the exercise of self-
representation, in part, on the defendant’s competency to (1) stand 
 
185 Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d at 1138 (describing the trial court’s inquiry as “woefully inade-
quate” when it refused to assign defendant new counsel upon request and informed defend-
ant that his only alternative was to represent himself, but advised that self-representation was 
not in his “best interests”). 
186 Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 922-23 (finding inquiry insufficient where trial court in-
formed defendant, in response to a request for new counsel, that “if he no longer wanted to 
be represented by his assigned counsel, then he could represent himself,” and explained that 
he would not receive assistance from the court, but his original assigned counsel would re-
main available as an advisor). 
187 See supra notes 185-86. 
188 Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156 (ruling that no valid waiver was effected where trial court 
sweepingly concluded that “there was no need to ask defendant any questions to know that 
he was ‘sensible to some extent’ ”). 
189 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[Many of the] procedural prob-
lems spawned by [the right to self-representation], such as the standards of waiver and the 
treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exer-
cise his right to self-representation.”) (emphasis added). 
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trial, (2) waive the right to counsel, and (3) proceed pro se.  The first 
two conditions can both be satisfied by the minimum competency 
standard articulated in Dusky, but trial courts have the discretion to 
require a heightened standard for the third condition if the defendant 
is mentally ill.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided 
much guidance for trial courts to apply these standards.  It is also dif-
ficult to rationalize the distinction the Court drew in both Godinez 
and Edwards between choosing to proceed pro se (i.e., waiving the 
right to counsel) and proceeding pro se.  As Justice Blackmun ob-
served in his Godinez dissent: 
It is obvious that a defendant who waives counsel 
must represent himself. . . . And a defendant who is ut-
terly incapable of conducting his own defense cannot 
be considered “competent” to make such a decision, 
any more than a person who chooses to leap out of a 
window in the belief that he can fly can be considered 
“competent” to make such a choice.190 
Thus, the distinction between choosing to proceed pro se and pro-
ceeding pro se is an artificial one, since a defendant is unlikely to ac-
complish one without the other.  Although the Court claimed a differ-
ence between the Edwards defendant representing himself to conduct 
his own trial, and the Godinez defendant representing himself “only 
to change his pleas to guilty,”191  both defendants ultimately conduct-
ed their own defenses.  The Court made an unjustified and arbitrary 
distinction by suggesting that different competency standards may 
apply depending on the nature of the self-representation. 
This distinction is particularly troublesome in light of the 
Court’s arguments in Godinez and Edwards, in support of the stand-
ards for waiving counsel and proceeding pro se, respectively.  In 
Godinez, the Court explicitly rejected the view that waiver of the 
right to counsel requires a higher level of mental functioning than 
that required to stand trial.  Yet the Court proffered that there may be 
a different competency standard to represent oneself, as distinguished 
from the standard to choose to represent oneself.  Indeed, in Edwards, 
the Court found that the standard of competency to represent oneself 
may be higher than the standard of competency to choose self-
representation when the defendant is mentally ill, reasoning that men-
 
190 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 416 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
191 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/14
2015 THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 917 
tal illness can vary in degree and manifest itself in different ways.  
But if these two standards may differ on this basis, then by the same 
logic—and contrary to the Court’s holding in Godinez—there is no 
reason that the standard for competency to stand trial cannot also dif-
fer from that required to waive counsel. 
New York’s approach is far more workable.  The New York 
Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to recognize differing 
standards of competency to complete various trial-related tasks.  It 
has reasoned that while there is no need to create separate inquiries 
into types of competency with different standards, mental competen-
cy is still highly relevant when determining a valid waiver.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s jump in logic—between Godinez, where it found no 
reason to require different competency standards for standing trial 
and waiving the right to counsel, and Edwards, where it held that 
mental illness can warrant different competency standards for waiv-
ing the right to counsel and proceeding pro se—is not a concern in 
New York.  Likewise, by treating waiver of the right to counsel and 
self-representation as cooperative and interdependent, New York 
avoids the conundrum created by the Supreme Court’s refusal to do 
the same.  In fact, the Court of Appeals has characterized waiver of 
counsel as a right that is “implicit [and] concomitant” in the right to 
self-representation.192 
VII. PEOPLE V. STONE REVISITED 
Consistent with its own precedent, the Court of Appeals in 
People v. Stone correctly decided the issue of whether the trial court 
was required to sua sponte order a competency hearing to assess 
Stone’s ability to conduct his own defense.  While Stone insisted that 
Edwards created a new rule in self-representation cases that trial 
courts must evaluate a defendant’s competency to proceed pro se, the 
Court of Appeals appropriately rejected this argument on the basis 
that New York has never required this as a separate and independent 
inquiry.  This is also consistent with federal law, since the Edwards 
Court specifically held that trial courts may deny mentally ill defend-
ants the right to self-representation, which does not mean they are re-
quired to, as Stone alleged.  With respect to Stone’s alternate argu-
ment, that Edwards created a baseline competency standard to stand 
 
192 Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d at 1138. 
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trial and a heightened standard to proceed pro se, the Court of Ap-
peals properly rejected this distinction pursuant to New York law, 
which does not recognize separate competency standards whatsoever.  
Although the Court of Appeals did not acknowledge the differing ap-
proaches employed by federal and New York courts with respect to 
competency standards, it did note that its view was not inconsistent 
with the federal view.  Again, the Edwards Court merely held that 
trial courts may impose a heightened competency standard when a 
mentally ill defendant seeks to represent himself, but they need not 
do so.  Indeed, New York has chosen not to, and this is constitution-
ally adequate. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional right to self-representation implicates con-
flicting interests that must be properly balanced, so courts have re-
sponded by reasonably limiting the exercise of this right.  Stemming 
from the longstanding due process requirement that a defendant be 
mentally competent to stand trial, the Supreme Court has additionally 
required that a defendant be mentally competent to waive his right to 
counsel and conduct his own defense before he can exercise his right 
to self-representation.  Regrettably, the federal decisions that articu-
lated these standards of competency are often inconsistent with one 
another.  New York, by contrast, has prevented such confusion by re-
fusing to create additional inquiries into mental competency beyond 
competency to stand trial.  Instead, New York considers a defend-
ant’s mental capabilities when determining whether he validly 
waived his right to counsel and can thus proceed on his own.  Over-
all, New York’s approach is more logical and practical, as it avoids 
so many of the variables that the Supreme Court has created. 
Julia M. Capie* 
 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2016; New York Universi-
ty, B.A. 2012.  I would like to thank my fiancé and Touro Law alumnus, Adam Ansanelli, 
who has guided me, mentored me, and supported me throughout my law school career.  My 
mom, Gina Carri, and my dad and s’mom, James and Jessica Capie, for their unconditional 
love and moral support in every aspect of my life.  My big sister, Melissa Monteforte, for 
showing me what it is to be a strong, wise woman, and my little brother and best friend, 
Jimmy Capie, for always keeping me laughing.  My Legal Process Professor, Debbie Lanin, 
for teaching me the nuanced skills of strong legal writing.  Last but not least, the staff of the 
Touro Law Review, especially my editor, James Lyons, and faculty advisor, Professor Ann 
Nowak, for their valuable guidance throughout my writing process. 
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/14
